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CASE COMMENT
CORDIAL V. GRIMM: IN SEARCH OF INDIANA'S
LEGAL MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally lawyers have been insulated from malpractice
liability by several "ancient legal principles," foremost of which are
state statutes of limitations.' In a waning number of jurisdictions
the applicable limitation period still commences to run when the at-
torney's negligence occurs.2 Like medical malpractice, however, at-
torneys' negligence is frequently neither discovered nor
discoverable until long after it occurs. Thus, under an occurrence
rule, a client's compensation for malpractice often depends upon for-
tuity- not the merit of his claim. Nevertheless, a recent increase in
litigation3 has spawned critical examination of the attorney-client
relationship and nearly universal condemnation of the occurrence
rule.' In the general absence of legislative action, contemporary
courts have rapidly begun to abandon the traditional rule altogether
or to temper it with other judicial doctrines.'
1. "The lawyer who commits a malpractice in the representation of his
clients .. .is protected by a maze of ancient legal principles which makes it virtually
impossible for the injured client to be made whole or even for the lawyer to be
reprimanded." Wallach & Kelly, Attorney Malpractice in California: A Shaky Citadel
10 SANTA CLARA LAW. 257 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Wallach & Kelly].
2. For an excellent discussion of the occurrence rule in legal malpractice, its
judicial origins and contemporary use, see MALLEN & LEVITT. LEGAL MALPRACTICE §
200 (1977) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL MALPRACTICE]. "No jurisdiction has recently
returned to or embraced the occurrence rule." Id. at 274. See also Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d
978 (1968); Lahrop, Legal Malpractice: Plaintiffs, Limiting Statutes and Heyer v.
Flaig, 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 258 (1970).
3. CASE AND COMMENT. Sept.-Oct., 1975, at 1 (leading malpractice insurance
carrier commenting that successful claims-against lawyers had increased twenty-five
percent within the last five years); New York Times, June 18, 1975, at 44, col. 1 (claims
processed by Continental National American "have just about doubled" in the last four
years).
4. E.g., Rothstein, Lawyers Malpractice in Litigation, 21 CLEV. ST. L. REV.,
May, 1972, at 1; Wallach & Kelly, supra note 1, at 260; Note, Commencement of the
Statute of Limitations in Legal Malpractice Actions-The Need for Re-Evaluation, 15
UCLA L. REV. 230 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note, Commencement of the Statute].
5. See notes 22-25 infra and accomanying text.
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Despite this transition in other jurisdictions, the Indiana
Supreme Court has not yet confronted the issues of which statute of
limitations governs legal malpractice actions in Indiana and, more
importantly, when the limitation period commences to run. In
Cordial v. Grimm,' however, the Third District Court of Appeals has
recently extended the protection of Indiana's "malpractice" statute
of limitations7 to lawyers; the statute contains an express occurrence
rule and was previously assumed to cover only the medical profes-
sion. Similarly, the court has relied upon prior medical malpractice
cases and their ameliorative "end of the relationship" test to deter-
mine when the two-year limitation commenced to run in a legal
malpractice claim. One other statute was approved by the court:
Indiana's general two-year statute of limitations for damage to per-
sonal property. Although that statute commences upon "accrual," a
term particularly susceptible to judicial discretion and interpreta-
tion, the court focused its analysis and conclusion solely on the more
restrictive malpractice statute.
One writer has concluded that the Cordial court merely defer-
red to future legislative action.! The court did not, in fact, defer, but
actively adopted a highly protective statute of limitations as well as
an impracticable and inequitable definition of when the attorney-
client relationship ended in Cordial The result may represent only
an insignificant departure from a strictly-construed occurrence rule,
if at all.
This comment will examine the holding, weaknesses and possi-
ble impact of Cordial v. Grimm. The analysis requires examination
of prior Indiana law, contemporary treatment of the issues in
foreign jurisdictions and some old and new policy arguments.
BACKGROUND OF CORDIAL V. GRIMM -POLICY ARGUMENTS AND
CURRENT JUDICIAL TREATMENT
Few commentators or courts presently advocate retention of
the occurrence rule or other forms of protective statutes of limita-
tions for the legal profession. Nevertheless, both the traditional ra-
tionale for statutes of limitations and some new arguments tailored
solely to the legal profession may be marshalled in support of a pro-
tective limitation. Upon analysis, these arguments appear clearly
unpersuasive in light of countervailing considerations.
6. __ Ind. App. -, 346 N.E.2d 266 (1976).
7. See notes 33 and 62 infra and accompanying text.
8. LEGAL MALPRACTICE. supra note 2, at 289.
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The traditional rationales for statutes of limitations are dual.
They continue to be tolerated by the judiciary as devices necessary
to prevent the evidentiary problems inherent in stale claims and the
possible resulting prejudice to innocent defendants. Secondly, they
are said to provide temporal security for the business and personal
affairs of society.'
In addition to the historical arguments, some lawyers have sug-
gested that the unique nature of the legal profession may alone
justify the artificial immunity of a protective statute of limitations.
One of these arguments relies upon the credible assumption that at-
torneys have an unusual vulnerability to suit due to the highly
technical, rapidly changing and unpredictable nature of the modern
American legal system."0 Thus, increased exposure to civil liability
would accelerate an impending legal malpractice insurance "crisis""
and perhaps threaten the availability of legal services. An ancillary
thesis is that increased exposure would also dampen "innovation and
progress" in the profession."
Despite these historical and contemporary arguments, however,
an increasing number of courts and the majority of commentators
favor abandonment of the occurrence rule for legal malpractice ac-
tions.'" Traditional reasons for the statutes are, to a large degree, in-
appropriate to legal malpractice. Moreover, the more modern
arguments for a protective statute have not been substantiated, and
9. See, e.g., Toth v. Lenk, - Ind. App. - - , 330 N.E.2d 336, 346
(1975); Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177,
1185 (1950); Note, Malpractice and the Statute of Limitations, 32 IND. L.J. 528 (1957).
Statutes of limitations have not always been viewed with affection by the Bar and
were formerly thought to create an unconscionable defense. "I will never plead the
statute ... when based on the mere efflux of time; for if my client is conscious he owes
the debt, and has no other defense than the legal bar, he shall never make me a part-
ner to his knavery." Resolution XII, HOFFMAN'S FIFTY RESOLUTIONS IN REGARD TO PRO-
FESSIONAL DEPORTMENT, 31 Reports of American Bar Ass'n 71 (1907).
10. E.g., Floro v. Lawton, 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 674, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98, 108
(1960) ("It would appear that the possibility of a malpractice action is an occupational
hazard for a lawyer.").
11. The possibility of a legal malpractice insurance crisis has been a recent
subject of concern in the A.B.A. See, e.g., ABA National Institute on Professional
Liability of Trial Lawyers, reprinted in, 45 U.S.L.W. 2535, 2537-78 (May 17, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as ABA National Institute]. See also Kroll, Choosing The Right
Legal Liability Insurance, CASE & COMMENT, Sept.-Oct., 1976, at 26 (explaining "occur-
rence" and "claims made" or "discovery" policies); LeHouillier, Legal Malpractice: The
Risks and Insurance Protection, 42 INS. COUNSEL J. 106 (1975).
12. Note, Commencement of the Statute, supra note 4, at 237.
13. See generally notes 1-4 supra and the cases cited in note 22 infra.
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the harm threatened by continued vitality of the occurrence rule has
become apparent.
Historical bases for statutes of limitations are indeed less per-
suasive in the specific area of legal malpractice. It is beyond dispute
that stale claims pose inherent evidentiary problems. Yet it is also
clear that a significant percentage of legal malpractice claims arise
from errors which are readily discernible from court records, or
even from the face of a single document.1 Furthermore, in legal
malpractice actions, loss of memory, witnesses or physical evidence
will more often prejudice the plaintiff, rather than the defendant at-
torney. With few exceptions, the plaintiff must bear the burden of
proving negligence, causation and damages in a legal malpractice
suit." Temporal security against suits by long-forgotten clients is
maintainable by legal malpractice insurance, and, if an insurance
"crisis" is indeed pending, a reduction in the frequency of malprac-
tice appears to be the feasible and best solution.'
Moreover, the interests of consumers of legal services far
outweigh the arguments for a protective statute of limitations. Most
14. "[fIn matters in which an attorney's negligence is apparent on the face of a
document, such as a will, contract, or title certification, there is little reason to bar a
claim because memories are unclear." Comment, New Developments in Legal Malprac-
tice, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 408, 441 (1977). Cf A.B.A. National Institute, supra note 11, at
2538 ("The vast majority of claims arise from the attorney's failure to properly process
cases, failure to observe a statute of limitations or conduct resulting in dismissals for
want of prosecution or default judgments."); Claims Contro" The Florida Study,
LEGAL MALPRACTICE REV., February/March, 1978, at 2 ("only 35 percent of malpractice
claims were for substantive issues of law, while 65 percent resulted from ad-
ministrative and clerical errors").
15. Courts generally have not, thus far, allowed plaintiffs to invoke the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitor in legal malpractice actions. For a critical analysis, see Note,
A Modern Approach to the Legal Malpractice Tort, 52 IND. L.J. 689 (1977). See also
Note, Legal Malpractice-Erosion of the Traditional Suit Within a Suit Requirement,
7 U. TOL. L. REV. 328, 331 (1975). As to Indiana law, see Donato v. Dutton, Kappes &
Overman, 154 Ind. App. 17, 288 N.E.2d 795 (1972) (approving, in dicta, application of
the doctrine to legal malpractice).
Often the client's file and some or all of the documents, correspondence and
records needed to prove his claim will be in the possession and control of his former
attorney. Lapse of time may result in misplacement, loss or destruction of those
papers. The plaintiff who attempts to retrieve the complete files before suit is filed
may also face considerable difficulty if his former attorney does not voluntarily com-
ply. See IND. CODE § 34-1-60-10 (1976). This statute provides that an attorney may be
held in contempt if he refuses, on request, to deliver "money or papers to a person
from whom or for whom he has received them in the course of his professional employ-
ment .... " The scope of "papers" has not, however, been determined by Indiana
courts.
16. See, e.g., note 14 supra and results of the Florida study in note 21, infra.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 [1979], Art. 6
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attorneys' malpractice is neither discovered nor discoverable by the
client promptly after it occurs.17 Recent decisions and articles have
repeatedly emphasized that the maze of procedural rules and legal
principles is mysterious to the average lay person. Generally unable
to evaluate his attorney's professional performance, the client is
equally unable to recognize negligence when it occurs. 8 Thus, both
the available, statistics and the dynamics of the attorney-client rela-
tionship indicate that a brief limitational period effectively bars a
substantial number of legal malpractice claims.
Removal of the arbitrary immunity afforded by the occurrence
rule would, however, effectively deter negligence, more frequently
shift the loss from legal malpractice to the negligent party, and
minimize the incentive for concealment. 9 The recent increase in
legal malpractice litigation has already resulted in intensified efforts
to reduce malpractice. Lawyers have been forced to educate
themselves about the common sources of error and how to eliminate
them. As the current intra-professional literature emphasizes, the
17. Francis McCarthy, general counsel for a legal malpractice insurance car-
rier has noted that "[t/he average malpractice claim ... takes about two and one half
years to be discovered" ABA National Institute, supra note 11, at 2537 (emphasis
added).
A lawyer is a legal expert; his client is not, and cannot be expected
to recognize substandard professional conduct. Requiring the client to
ascertain malpractice at the moment of its occurrence casts upon him the
unfair and impractical burden of either knowing as much about the law as
does his attorney or hiring a second attorney to scrutinize the work of the
first.
Comment, New Developments in Legal Malpractice, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 408, 439 (1977)
(footnotes omitted).
18. Furthermore, the attorney can actively or passively conceal his negligence
with relative ease and thus contribute to delayed discovery. Note, Legal Malprac-
tice-Is The Discovery Rule the Final Solution?, 24 HASTINGS L. REV. 795, 801 (1973).
See also Neel v. Magna, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 188-91, 491
P.2d 421, 428-30, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 844-46 (1971) (adopting the discovery rule for legal
malpractice claims in California with a persuasive policy discussion). Unlike a doctor's
patient, a client faces some difficulty in consulting a second attorney during the term
of the relationship. See, e.g., Kohler v. Woollen, Brown & Hawkins, 15 Ill. App. 3d 455,
460, 304 N.E.2d 677, 680 (1973); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, E.C. 2-30
(1974).
19. Wallach & Kelly, supra note 1, at 257; Note, Commencement of the
Statute, supra note 4, at 237 ("Society's significant interest in malpractice claims as a
means of encouraging attorneys to maintain a high degree of care . . . requires that
such claims have a just disposition."); Note, A Modern Approach to the Legal Malprac-
tice Tort, 52 IND. L.J. 689, 708 (1977).
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best way to prevent malpractice suits is to prevent malpractice."
Similarly, the abandonment of protective statutes of limitations will
probably promote, rather than stifle, "innovation and progress" in
the profession.21 Thus continued adherence to the occurrence rule
poses only long-term damage to both the profession and its clients.
In response to these and other policy considerations, foreign
jurisdictions have begun to abandon the occurrence rule for legal
malpractice actions or temper it with ameliorative judicial doctrines.
At least twelve jurisdictions have recently adopted the "discovery
rule" for legal malpractice claims. Under the discovery rule, the ap-
plicable statutory limitation does not commence to run until the
client discovers or reasonably should have discovered his cause of
action.2 Other state courts have achieved partial reform by use of
the doctrines of "continuous representation" (limitation commences
with termination of the attorney-client relationship);' "fraudulent
concealment" (limitation is tolled until the end of the attorney-client
relationship or later);24 and the "damage rule" (cause of action does
20. E.g., "[M]andatory continuing legal education programs, more effective
peer discipline, and, perhaps, higher admission standards would go a long way toward
eliminating the root causes of malpractice -negligence, greed, and outright in-
competence." ABA National Institute, supra note 11, at 2573. See also Wallach & Kel-
ly, supra note 1, at 257; Note, A Modern Approach to The Legal Malpractice Tort, 52
IND. L.J. 689, 691 (1977).
21. This conclusion has been pragmatically supported by the results of an
educational and preventive law campaign launched by a legal malpractice insurance
company in conjunction with the Florida State Bar in 1976. In 1977, the number of
legal malpractice claims against Florida attorneys dropped for the first time in four
years. Claims for missed statutes of limitations fell "from 115 in 1976 to just 44 in
1977." Claims Control The Florida Study, LEGAL MALPRACTICE REV., February/March,
1978, at 2.
Florida has had a "discovery rule" for legal malpractice claims since 1969.
Downing v. Vaine, 228 So. 2d 622, 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
22. For an exhaustive discussion of the discovery rule in legal malpractice and
a list of the jurisdictions which have adopted it, see LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2,
at § 206. However, Biberstine v. Woodworth, 81 Mich. App. 705, 265 N.W.2d 797
(1978), and Berry v. Zisman, 70 Mich. App. 376, 377, 245 N.W.2d 758, 759 (1976), should
be added as discovery rule decisions under Michigan's malpractice statute of limita-
tion.
23. Derived from the "continuous treatment" doctrine used in medical
malpractice cases, the continuous representation rule delays commencement of the
statute of limitations until the attorney's representation concerning a particular matter
is terminated. See LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, at § 202.
24. The fraudulent concealment doctrine is used, in varying forms, in nearly
every jurisdiction. Generally, any affirmative misrepresentations by the attorney
which causes his client to delay suit will toll commencement of the statute of limita-
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 [1979], Art. 6
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not accrue until damage or injury has resulted).25
Cordial v. Grimm"6 was the first Indiana appellate decision to
confront the issues of which statute of limitations should govern a
legal malpractice action and, more importantly, when the limita-
tional period will commence. The court has summarily rejected ap-
plication of the discovery rule and declined to decide whether the
damage rule should apply to legal malpractice actions. Indiana
courts have consistently applied a fraudulent concealment doctrine
in medical malpractice cases. The statute of limitations is
automatically tolled until termination of the professional relation-
ship by a presumed constructive fraudulent concealment.27 The
result is identical to a "continuous treatment" or "end of the rela-
tions until the client discovers his claim. The requirements of intent and knowledge
associated with common law fraud are often not essential to invoke the doctrine and,
in some jurisdictions, passive concealment is sufficient. A complete discussion of the
doctrine can be found in LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, at § 203. As to develop-
ment of the doctrine in Indiana, see notes 44 through 56, infra and accompanying text.
25. See generally LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, at § 201; Sacks, Statutes
of Limitations and Undiscovered Malpractice, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 65 (1967); Note,
Commencement of the Statute, supra note 4, at 230-34.
In many cases attorney negligence will not result in actual damages until years
after its occurrence. Primary examples are the negligently drafted will, contract or ti-
tle abstract. Moreover, whether or not the error eventually causes any damage may
depend upon purely fortuitous circumstances.
Although the damage rule is potentially less harsh to plaintiffs than the occur-
rence rule, it has proved much more difficult to define. If the defendant's act of
malpractice does not initially cause compensable damage, commencement of the statute
may be delayed until damage results. E.g., Ft. Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe
& Johnson, 381 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (claim held timely since bad legal advice did
not result in damage until three years before suit was filed); Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d
195, 491 P.2d 433, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971) ("The mere breach of a professional duty,
causing only nominal damages, speculative harm, or the threat of future harm -not yet
realized-does not suffice to create a cause of action for negligence." Thus the statute
does not commence to run until actual injury occurs.). See generally Developments in
the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1201-03 (1950). Determined
courts can, however, achieve an occurrence rule result by holding that the defendant's
negligence caused immediate damages, even though there was no apparent manifesta-
tion of the injury until after the statute had run. E.g., Weinstein v. Blanchard, 109
N.J.L. 332, 162 A. 601 (1932) (defendant physician failed to remove a rubber sponge;
claim was barred even though no actual damage resulted until 19 years later). Cf.
Eckert v. Schaal, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1, 58 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967) (cause of action did not
"accrue" until injury resulted, but injury existed when plaintiffs relied on the
attorney's advice, not when a derivative suit was filed against the plaintiffs). Eckert v.
Schaal was specifically overruled by the California Supreme Court. Neel v. Magana,
Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d 421 (1971).
26. __ Ind. App. - , 346 N.E.2d 266 (1976).
27. See notes 46-56, infra.
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tionship" rule. In Cordial, the court held that this "end of the rela-
tionship" rule applies also to legal malpractice actions. Contrary to
other jurisdictions, however, the court found that the attorney-client
relationship had terminated with the "last act" of the attorney and
before his client's pending litigation was resolved. Thus, Cordial
may represent only a minimal departure from a strict occurrence
rule.
CORDIAL V. GRIMM-FACTS AND HOLDING
The inadequate record of facts reported in Cordial may have
been the result of Cordial's pro se appearance before the trial court.
In 1966 Cordial employed the defendant attorneys to pursue his
workmen's compensation claim. That claim was lost in 1967 and
Cordial's attorneys subsequently initiated a second claim in March,
1968, based upon the same injury. Cordial's second workmen's comp-
ensation claim was also denied in February, 1969, on the ground that
it was barred by the first adverse ruling. Apparently Cordial's at-
torneys then filed an application for review with the full In-
dustrial Board in June of 1969. In March, 1971, the full Board affirmed
the decision of the administrative law judge, denying Cordial's sec-
ond claim.28
One year later, after unsuccessful efforts to obtain counsel,
Cordial filed suit against his former attorneys, alleging malpractice
in connection with his valid workmen's compensation claim. The
defendants moved for summary judgment against Cordial, contend-
ing that the action was commenced too late. Without specifying
which statute of limitations it had relied upon, the trial court
granted the summary judgment, 9 which was ultimately affirmed by
the Third District Court of Appeals in Cordial v. Grimm.
Without specific legislative guidance or prior decisions to rely
on, the Cordial court was forced to decide which of several potentially
applicable statutes of limitations should govern a legal malpractice
action and when those statutes commenced to run. Cordial first
argued that his action was properly for breach of contract, governed
by Indiana's longer statutes of limitations.' But the court rejected
28. 346 N.E.2d at 268.
29. Id.
30. Legal malpractice actions can be maintained under negligence or breach of
contract terminology. See generally Comment, New Developments in Legal Malprac-
tice, 26 AM. U.L. REv. 408, 435-39 (1977); Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 978 (1968).
The Cordial court could have applied Indiana's breach of contract statutes. IND.
CODE § 34-1-2-1 (1976) (oral contracts-six years); IND. CODE § 34-1-2-2 (1976) (written
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 [1979], Art. 6
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the breach of contract theory, holding instead that the claim sounded
in tort." Thus, two statutes were applied to Cordial's claim: the two-
year general limitation for negligent damage to personal prop-
erty, 2 and Indiana's two-year limitation for medical malpractice.3
Application of the General Limitation for Damage to Personal Property
The two-year statute of limitations for damage to personal prop-
erty was deemed appropriate because Cordial's workmen's compen-
sation claim was a "chose in action," his intangible personal prop-
erty .3  That statute contains no legislative mandate for commence-
contract-twenty years); Rooker v. Bruce, 45 Ind. App. 57, 58, 90 N.E. 86, 87 (1909) (an
attorney impliedly contracts to exercise due care, skill and knowledge of the law). But
see Corcellor v. Brooks, 347 So. 2d 274, 277 (La. App. 1977) ("Warranty or guarantee
by an attorney of a particular result is foreign to the nature of the legal profession.");
Glen Falls Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 3 App. Div. 2d 686, 159 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1957) (malpractice
action governed by negligence statute unless the attorney guaranteed a specific
result).
Historically, privity of contract has been a requirement for maintainance of a
legal malpractice action. E.g., Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 200 (1879). Recent
decisions and the majority of commentators, however, favor relaxation of the require-
ment. E.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962) (no privity requirement for intended beneficiaries of a
negligently drawn will); Williams v. Polga, 391 Mich. 6, 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974) (liability
for defective title abstract extended to any third party who could reasonably be
expected to rely on it). See generally LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, at § 59; Note,
Public Accountants and Attorneys: Negligence and the Third Party, 47 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 588, 609 (1972).
31. 346 N.E.2d at 269. This is consistent with the general trend in other
jurisdictions. See LEGAL MALPRACTICE supra note 2, at §§ 193-98. The court was also
determined to discourage plaintiffs from pleading several causes of action in an
attempt to bring themselves within the most favorable statute. 346 N.E.2d at 269.
32. "The following actions shall be commenced within the periods herein
prescribed after the cause of action has accrued, and not afterwards. For injuries to
person or character, for injuries to personal property . . . within two (2) years." IND.
CODE § 34-1-2-2 (1976).
33. IND. CODE § 34-4-19-1 (1976):
No actions of any kind for damages, whether brought in contract or tort,
based upon professional services rendered or which should have been
rendered, shall be brought, commenced or maintained, in any of the
courts of this state against physicians, dentists, surgeons, hospitals,
sanitariums, or others, unless said action is filed within two (2) years from
the date of the act, ommission or neglect complained of.
This statute has been re-enacted nearly verbatim in Indiana's new Medical
Malpractice Act. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-3-1 (1976). However, the new Act applies only to
"qualified" health care providers. See Survey- Torts, 9 IND. L. REV., 340, 360-61 (1975).
34. 346 N.E.2d at 270.
et al.: Cordial v. Grimm: In Search of Indiana's Legal Malpractice Statut
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1979
392 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 13
ment, but is triggered by "accrual," a term peculiarly open to
judicial discretion. 5
The court did not exercise its authority to define "accrual" of a
legal malpractice action liberally. Cordial's argument that his cause
of action had not accrued until his discovery of malpractice was sum-
marily rejected: "[S]uch is not the law in Indiana."" Cordial next
asserted a damage rule theory, contending that his cause of action
had not accrued until he had suffered damage 7 and that his damage
had not matured until his appeal was denied by the full Industrial
Board, one year before suit was filed. Without deciding whether a
damage rule was indeed applicable in Indiana, the court found that
any injury or damages had occurred in 1967, when Cordial's first
workmen's compensation claim was denied. 8 Therefore, the
plaintiffs claim could not be saved by the damage rule since suit
was not commenced until 1971."9 The primary emphasis of Cordial,
however, is devoted to adoption of Indiana's medical malpractice
statute, with its express occurrence rule, as the appropriate limita-
tion for legal malpractice claims.
Extended Scope of the Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations
Cordial's extension of Indiana's medical malpractice statute of
limitations to embrace the legal profession rested ostensibly upon
legislative intent. Although members of the health professions are
the only enumerated objects of the statute, ° its title and broad
language were held to supercede Cordial's "ejusdem generis" argu-
ment.' The statute is titled simply as "malpractice" and, as the
35. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 511 F.2d 1019, 1020-21 (6th Cir. 1975) (On
the basis of a medical malpractice decision rendered before Woodruff, the court over-
ruled prior Tennessee law to hold that a legal malpractice action did not accrue until
the client discovered or should have discovered his claim.); Kohler v. Woolen, Brown &
Hawkins, 15 Ill. App. 3d 455, 460, 304 N.E.2d 677, 681 (1973); Hendrickson v. Sears, 365
Mass. 83, 88, 310 N.E.2d 131, 134 (1974) ("[I]n general, the definition of accrual has been
left to judicial rationalization and interpretation."). See generally LEGAL MALPRACTICE,
supra note 2, at § 204.
36. 346 N.E.2d at 273.
37. Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 161 N.E. 251 (1928) (an action does not
,.accrue" until both injury and "damages susceptible of ascertainment" have occurred)
(emphasis added). Accord, Wabash County v. Pearson, 120 Ind. 426, 428, 22 N.E. 134,
135 (1889). Neither of these Indiana Supreme Court decisions, under the general
negligence statutes of limitations, was cited by the Cordial court.
38. 346 N.E.2d at 273.
39. Id
40. See note 33 supra.
41. In the construction of laws . . . the 'ejusdem generis rule' is, that
where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 [1979], Art. 6
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court duly noted, that terminology encompasses attorneys' as well
as physicians' negligence.' 2 Moreover, the specific list of health care
providers designated in the statute is followed by the nebulous
phrase, "or others."'" Thus the language of the malpractice statute,
if not its history, provided some basis for bringing Indiana lawyers
within its protective canopy. In determining when the malpractice
statute had commenced to run against Cordial's claim, the court at-
tempted to assimilate prior medical malpractice decisions and the
"end of the relationship" rule, established prior to Cordial A
preliminary discussion of these prior cases is, therefore, essential to
an understanding of Cordial v. Grimm.
Commencement of the Malpractice Statute: Fraudulent Concealment
Since 1956, Indiana's strict malpractice statute of limitations
has been judicially tempered by principles of equitable estoppel and
an expanded fraudulent concealment doctrine. In Guy v. Shuldt the
Indiana Supreme Court first held that an action for medical malprac-
tice was not demurrable, even though commenced more than twelve
years after the "act, omission or neglect complained of."" The court
determined that equity would not allow a fiduciary to gain the pro-
tection of a statute of limitations by a breach of his duty to disclose
all material information. 5 Such a breach of the duty to inform was
words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are ... to
be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or
class as those specifically mentioned.
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 608 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
Plaintiff argued that the doctrine should have excluded legal malpractice from
the ambit of the malpractice statute of limitations, since lawyers are not among the
professionals enumerated there. See note 33 supra. Nevertheless, the court rejected
plaintiffs argument, noting that the ejusdem generis doctrine "should not become a
device for unduly narrowing the scope and operations of statutes to an extent never
envisioned .... 346 N.E.2d at 271.
42. Id. Curiously, the court went on to hold that the term applies only to the
medical and legal professions. Id. at 272.
43. See note 33 supra. 346 N.E.2d at 269.
44. IND. CODE § 34-4-19-1 (1976). The physician's negligence occurred in 1941. A
broken drill bit was discovered in the plaintiffs leg in November, 1952, and suit was
commenced in August, 1954. Reversing judgment for the physician, the court held that
the complaint was not demurrable because the question of concealment was one of
fact, even though not pleaded. 236 Ind. 101, 110, 138 N.E.2d 891, 896 (1956).
45. Id. at 108-09, 138 N.E.2d at 895. Accord, Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment
and the Statutes of Limitations, 31 MICH. L. REV. 875, 887 (1933) (The fiduciary rela-
tionship imposes upon the professional a duty to disclose all material facts, a breach of
which constitutes concealment and fraud.).
Attorneys also have a duty to disclose all material facts which are important to
19791
et al.: Cordial v. Grimm: In Search of Indiana's Legal Malpractice Statut
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1979
394 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 13
held to constitute constructive concealment and toll commencement
of the malpractice statute until termination of the professional rela-
tionship."
Fraud terminology is, perhaps, unfortunate because Guy and
its progeny have transformed the fraudulent concealment doctrine
into a nearly automatic tolling provision for actions within the
malpractice statute of limitations. Active concealment is not re-
quired; silence alone is sufficient to invoke the doctrine against a
fiduciary who has a duty to speak." Furthermore, proof of the tradi-
tional elements of fraud-intent and scienter-is not required to toll
commencement of the statute. 8 A fiduciary has the duty to know as
well as to disclose what he knows. 9 Thus a physician or an attorney
who is unaware that he has fallen below the professional standard of
care 50 may, nevertheless, "fraudulently conceal" his negligence.
the client. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, E.C. 9-2 (1974). See also Hall v.
Indiana Department of State Revenue, - Ind. App. - , - , 351 N.E.2d 35, 40
(1976); Manley v. Felty, 146 Ind. 194, 45 N.E. 74 (1896).
46. 236 Ind. 101, 109, 138 N.E.2d 891, 895 (1956). The Guy court expressly held
that silence will be sufficient to constitute constructive fraudulent concealment: "[T]he
estoppel to plead limitations may arise ... from the defendant's conduct or even from
his silence when under an affirmative duty to speak." Id, citing 53 C.J.S., Limitation
of Actions, § 25, pp. 962, 964 (emphasis in original).
Constructive fraudulent concealment has consistently been held to terminate
with the doctor-patient relationship in Indiana. "[WI]here the duty to inform exists by
reason of a confidential relationship, when that relationship is terminated, concealment
then ceases to exist." Guy v. Shuldt, 236 Ind. at 109, 138 N.E.2d at 895. Accord, Cor-
dial v. Grimm, __ Ind. App. - _ , 346 N.E.2d 266, 272 (1976), citing Ostojic v.
Brueckman, 405 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1968); Toth v. Lenk, __ Ind. App. 330
N.E.2d 336, 339 (1975).
47. Id
48. "Fraud may consist of intentional deception . Guy v. Shuldt, 236 Ind.
101, 109, 138 N.E.2d 891, 895 (1956) (emphasis added); Marcum v. Richmond Auto
Parts, 149 Ind. App. 120, 127, 270 N.E.2d 884, 888 (1971) ("[Ilt is not essential that the
representations or conduct giving rise to its application should be fraudulent in the
strictly legal significance of that term, or with intent to mislead or deceive .... ") Ac-
cord, Toth v. Lenk, - Ind. App. , -, 330 N.E.2d 336, 339 n.3 (1975).
49. This is particularly true in the attorney-client relationship. "A fiduciary
such as an attorney . . . [has] the duty to investigate the law and facts applicable to the
transaction and to disclose the results to his clients. The duty is that imposed upon a
trustee who must disclose all material facts . . . the trustee knows or should know."
Burien Motors, Inc. v. Balch, 9 Wash. App. 573, 578, 513 P.2d 582, 586 (1973). Cf. Boss-
Harrison Motel Co. v. Barnard, 148 Ind. App. 406, 407, 266 N.E.2d 810, 811 (1971) (good
appellate advocacy demands regular reading of Advance Sheets). For a general discus-
sion of the attorney's duty to know, see Malpractice and the Under-Informed Lawyer
Or, What You Don't Know May Really Hurt You After Al 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 333
(1977).
50. Three fundamental ingredients underlie the Guy rule for fraudulent con-
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The ameliorative end of the relationship test established in
Guy was also arbitrary, resting upon the assumption that a patient
would not rely on his doctor's silence after the relationship ended."
In Van Bronckhorst v. Taube," however, the Second District Court
of Appeals clearly distinguished those cases where active
misrepresentation is alleged, and held that affirmative concealment
would toll commencement of the malpractice statute until the pa-
tient discovered or should have discovered his cause of action.53 Van
Bronckhorst appeard to be consistent with both the earlier Indiana
Supreme Court decision in Guy and the underlying principle of
equitable estoppel."' In dicta only, the second district also indicated
that it might decline to apply the arbitrary "end for the relation-
ship" test, even in the absence of affirmative concealment. 5 Thus,
prior to Cordial, a line of medical malpractice cases had converted
the fraudulent concealment doctrine into a rather clear rule for com-
mencement of the malpractice statute of limitations. Despite the oc-
currence rule in the statute, it would not commence to run until the
cealment-a fiduciary relationship, a corresponding duty to disclose all material facts
and a right to rely on the professional's compliance with that duty. These are well-
established elements of the attorney-client relationship. See, e.g., ABA CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, E.C. 9-2 (1974); Hall v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, __
Ind. App. -, -, 351 N.E.2d 35, 40 (1976).
51. See note 46 supra.
52. - Ind. App. - , 341 N.E.2d 791 (1976).
53. [W]e hold that such termination of relationship where there has
been affirmative misrepresentation as here alleged does not, as a matter
of law, commence the clock ticking on the statute of limitations.
The legal consideration then translates into a question of whether,
and when, if at all, the patient has a reasonable opportunity to discover
his condition, so that reliance upon the representations of his former
physicians became unreasonable.
Id. at 798. The court further held that Ostojic v. Bruekman, 405 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.
1968), was an incorrect interpretation of Indiana law, not binding on Indiana courts. Id.
54. 341 N.E.2d at 797. Indeed, the possibility of affirmative concealment is the
only reasonable explanation for the Indiana Supreme Court's remand in the Guy case.
The record clearly showed that the doctor-patient relationship had ended more than
twelve years before suit was filed. Guy v. Shuldt, 236 Ind. 101, 109, 138 N.E.2d 891,
895 (1956).
There is authority in Indiana that affirmative fraudulent concealment of a claim
for negligence will not, alone, bring the plaintiffs action within the six year statute of
limitations for fraud, IND. CODE § 34-1-2-1 (1976). Miladin v. Istrate, 125 Ind. App. 46,
119 N.E.2d 12, reh. denied, 125 Ind. App. 46, 119 N.E.2d 901 (1954). See generally
Note, Malpractice and the Statute of Limitations, 32 IND. L.J. 528, 535 (1956). But see
IND. CODE § 34-1-60-9 (Supp. 1978) ("An attorney who is guilty of deceit or collusion, or
consents thereto, with intent to deceive ... a party to an action or judicial proceeding
• . . shall forfeit to the party injured treble damages, recoverable in a civil action.").
55. 341 N.E.2d at 798.
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end of the fiduciary relationship or discovery of negligence by the
patient, whichever came first." If affirmative concealment existed,
however, the statute would be tolled until the patient discovered or
should have discovered his claim, regardless of when the relation-
ship had terminated.
This peculiar development of the fraudulent concealment doc-
trine reflected the circuitous route taken by the courts, prior to
Cordial, to avoid strict compliance with the malpractice statute and
its harsh occurrence rule. Nevertheless, the statute had clearly served
to inhibit judicial adoption of a pure discovery rule for medical
malpractice cases. Since the Cordial court held that the malpractice
statute governed the plaintiffs claim, the court also relied on the
fraudulent concealment doctrine to determine when the statute had
begun to run against Cordial.
Application of the Fraudulent Concealment Doctrine in Cordial
Without significant analysis, the Cordial court held that ap-
plibation of the fraudulent concealment doctrine could not save the
plaintiffs claim. Cordial had filed his suit in March, 1972, only one
year after his workmen's compensation claim was denied by the full
Industrial Board on review. 7 Nevertheless, the attorney-client rela-
tionship and, therefore, any constructive concealment were found to
have terminated in June, 1969, with the attorneys' "last act" on
behalf of their client. 8 The relationship did not continue beyond that
"last act," apparently because Cordial had not consulted with his at-
torneys after that date and because the appeal was not a "proper
procedure."59 Affirmative concealment was not alleged by Cordial,
but the court did indicate impliedly that affirmative concealment, if
alleged, would have been a bar to summary judgment: "The ap-
pellant has never asserted that he consulted with either of the ap-
pellees after such dates, or that they acted after such dates to con-
ceal their alleged malpractice."' Therefore, since the attorney-client
56. When the patient has "actual knowledge" of the injury, the presumption
of fraudulent concealment is destroyed and the statute will commence from the date of
discovery. Toth v. Lenk, - Ind. App -.. 330 N.E.2d 336, 342 n.2 (1975)
(Hoffman, J., concurring) (third district).
57. 346 N.E.2d at 268.
58. 346 N.E.2d at 272-73. It is not clear from the reported facts what this "last
act" was. June 27, 1969, may have been the date on which Cordial's attorneys filed his
application for review by the full Industrial Board.
59. Id.
60. Id Cordial may have tried to articulate a theory that the appeal itself was
an act of concealment. "[Aippellant infers that a constructive fraudulent concealment of
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 [1979], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol13/iss2/6
LEGAL MALPRACTICE
relationship and any constructive concealment ended over two years
before suit was filed, summary judgment against Cordial was
affirmed.61
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CORDIAL V. GRIMM
The implicit but unstated objectives of the Cordial opinion
were to apply identical law to the medical and legal professions and
to maximize the procedural protection available to defendant at-
torneys. Future decisions should not, however, share the objectives
or conclusions of the Cordial court. Moreover, the barriers against
liability which Cordial has erected may be easily eroded without a
significant departure from existing law. A result more equitable to
victims of legal malpractice may be achieved by rejecting Cordial's
application of the medical malpractice statute, expanding the
fraudulent concealment doctrine or simply redefining when the
attorney-client relationship ends.
Cordial's application of the medical malpractice statute of
limitations to legal malpractice may not be affirmed by the Indiana
Supreme Court or other districts. The statute has traditionally been
viewed with disaffection by the courts and limited in scope to the
medical profession because of the express occurrence rule as well as
the apparent history and purpose of the statute. 2
Although not apparent from the Cordial decision, the general
negligence statute of limitations (also two years) allows for much
greater judicial discretion. First, the general negligence statute com-
his cause of action occurred after the termination of professional relationships ... 'ow-
ing to the concatenation of events .... '" The court did not address the issue of
whether an appeal may constitute affirmative fraudulent concealment, holding only
that any constructive concealment ended with the relationship. Id.
61. Id.
62. In Chaffin v. Nicosia, 261 Ind. 698, 310 N.E.2d 867 (1974), the medical
malpractice statute was challenged on state constitutional grounds. The court held
that: "The classification at issue does not appear unconstitutional per se. There exists
a reasonable basis for distinguishing between those rendering medical services and
those who do not." Id. at 702, 310 N.E.2d at 970. Accord, Meier v. Combs, 147 Ind.
App. 617, 263 N.E.2d 194 (1970).
[A]n action should not be held to be based on the rendition of 'professional
services' (for the purpose of barring it by the statute) [IND. CODE §
34-4-19-1 (1976)] unless the rendition of some service which cannot legally
be rendered except by ... a licensed physician, dentist or surgeon is an
integral and essential part of the cause of action.
Id- at 625, 263 N.E.2d at 199; Toth v. Lenk, - Ind. App..... 330 N.E.2d 336,
338 (1975) (Third District). None of these cases were cited in Cordial.
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mences upon "accrual";' the courts retain the freedom to define
liberally when a legal malpractice action should accrue." Secondly,
unlike the malpractice statute, the general negligence statute of
limitations does not inhibit the courts from expanding the equitable
doctrine of fraudulent concealment. In the highly fiduciary attorney-
client relationship, silence may conceal injury or a cause of action
just as effectively as may affirmative misrepresentations. The
general negligence statute of limitations contains no legislative oc-
currence rule, and the courts are free to rely on equity to toll com-
mencement of the statute until the client discovers or should have
discovered his cause of action."5 Nevertheless, in Cordial the court
failed to note the inherent distinctions between the two statutes it
adopted for legal malpractice claims.
The most fragile portion of the Cordial opinion, however, is its
tortured and premature delineation of when the attorney-client rela-
tionship terminated. The court's conclusion that the relationship had
ended with the attorneys' "last act" and before Cordial's appeal was
resolved is inconsistent with both the weight of legal authority and
the policy underlying Indiana's fraudulent concealment doctrine.
The stated purpose of the fraudulent concealment doctrine is to
prevent a fiduciary from gaining immunity for his malpractice by a
63. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
64. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
65. Marcum v. Richmond Auto Parts, 149 Ind. App. 120, 270 N.E.2d 884
(1971), appears to be the leading case concerning application of Indiana's fraudulent
concealment doctrine to the general statutes of limitations. In Marcum the plaintiff
brought an action for personal injury. The insurance carrier for the defendant had
represented to the plaintiff that settlement would be made, but denied liability after
the statute had run. I& at 121-22, 270 N.E.2d at 885.
The court held that both affirmative and constructive fraudulent concealment
would toll the statute of limitations in a negligence action until the plaintiff discovered or
should have discovered his claim. "It cannot be seriously contended that one could surren-
der a legal right of which he has no knowledge." Id. at 125, 270 N.E.2d at 886-88 (citations
omitted). Furthermore, the opinion emphasized that equitable estoppel would prevent
a fiduciary from gaining protection of a statute of limitations by a breach of his duty to
disclose, and that silence alone could effectively conceal injury. I& at 127, 270 N.E.2d
at 888. There is no indication in Marcum that a general statute of limitations govern-
ing negligence actions will necessarily commence to run when a professional relation-
ship terminates.
IND. CODE § 34-1-2-9 (1976), provides that "if any person liable to an action shall
conceal the fact from the knowledge of the person entitled thereto, the action may be
commenced at any time within the period of limitation, after the discovery of the cause
of action." The courts have held that this statute, enacted in 1881, is not an
"exception" to the malpractice statute of limitations. Guy v. Shuldt, 236 Ind. 101, 104,
138 N.E.2d 891, 893 (1956). No decision, however, had held it to be inapplicable to the
general statutes of limitations.
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second breach of his duty to disclose all material facts."6 Certainly,
Cordial's attorneys had an ethical and legal obligation to advise
their client if his workmen's compensation appeal was indeed an im-
proper procedure and had no possibility of success. But the court
found that the relationship had terminated before the appeal was
decided, apparently because the appeal had no chance of success and
because the attorneys did not "act" or consult with their client after
June, 1969.68 Thus, the result of the Cordial analysis and holding is
that negligent attorneys will be encouraged to seek immunity from
suit by "appearing to represent the client when in fact representing
[their] own interests." 9 The negligent attorney who is acquainted
with the Cordial decision may well conclude that he can escape all
liability by simply filing a frivolous appeal or "holding on to the
case" 7 for two more years. Not only would the statute of limitations
expire during that time, but the client would be lulled into ac-
quiescence and hindered from consulting a second attorney.7 1
Several foreign jurisdictions have properly defined when the
attorney-client relationship ends -definitions which would prevent
the abuse inherent in the Cordial opinion. The relationship continues
until litigation has reached final judgment," until the client has
discharged his attorney from employment, or until a court has for-
mally relieved the attorney of his professional obligation." In any
event, the attorney's representation in a particular matter cannot be
unilaterally terminated by the attorney without notice to his client.7'
While a "last act" rule may be appropriate to determine when a
66. Guy v. Shuldt, 236 Ind. 101, 109, 138 N.E.2d 891, 895 (1956) ("[Wlhen a
defendant... by deception or any violation of duty toward the plaintiff caused him to
subject his claim to the statutory bar, he must be charged with having wrongfully ob-
tained an advantage which the court will not allow him to hold.").
67. 346 N.E.2d at 273.
68. Id.
69. LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, at 275. An analytical and thorough
discussion of the continuous representation rule or end of the relationship test, as used
in other jurisdictions, has been provided at id. at § 202.
70. Wilson v. Econom, 56 Misc. 2d 272, 274, 288 N.Y.S.2d 381, 383-84 (1968).
71. See note 18 supra.
72. Woodruff v. Tomlin, 511 F.2d 1019, 1021 (6th Cir. 1975).
73. Berry v. Zisman, 70 Mich. App. 376, 377, 245 N.W.2d 758, 759 (1976) (con-
struing prior law that an action based on professional malpractice, must be brought
within two years of the end of the relationship or within two years of the time when the
plaintiff discovers or should discover the alleged malpractice, whichever is later). This
is the inverse of the present rule in Indiana.
74. See, e.g., Jones v. Schreiber, 47 U.S.L.W. 2451 (N.Y. Cty. Sup. Ct. Jan. 23,
1979).
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doctor-patient relationship ends, Cordial is the only reported opinion
to use such simplistic analysis in the setting of the attorney-client
relationship. The attorney's "last act" may come well before the
client's litigation is resolved and may even come before the legal
malpractice occurs." In fact, the rule announced in Cordial, if applied
to future cases, might well be even more protective than the tradi-
tional strict occurrence rule. Cordial's "last act" rule for determin-
ing when the attorney-client relationship ends is not only in-
equitable, but functionally and legally unsound.
CONCLUSION
In the absence of other appellate decisions or, legislative
guidance, Cordial v. Grimm remains the sole specific precedent to
determine when a legal malpractice action is temporally barred in
Indiana. The apparent rule established by Cordial can be formulated
as follows: unless affirmative concealment exists, a two-year limita-
tion period commences when the attorney-client relationship ends or
when the client discovers or should have discovered his cause of ac-
tion, whichever occurs first. What will constitute affirmative con-
cealment has not been defined by Cordial, and the relationship may
terminate as early as the attorney's "last act" on behalf of his client.
Thus, at least on its particular facts, Cordial has not significantly
departed from a strict occurrence rule for legal malpractice actions.
The decision cannot, however, be explained as a product of judicial
deference to the legislature." No authority cited in Cordial or
elsewhere indicates that Indiana's "malpractice" statute of limita-
tions was intended to protect anyone other than the medical profes-
sion. Moreover, the courts may be the institution best suited to deal
with legal malpractice issues.7
75. For example, when an attorney fails to file his client's tort claim before
the statute of limitations runs, the date when the client's underlying claim became bar-
red is also the date when the attorney's negligence occurred. Yet if the attorney had
performed some "last act" before his negligence occurred, the Cordial rationale would
mark that earlier date as the end of the relationship and the statute of limitations
would commence to run.
76. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
77. When dealing with a judicially defined concept, legislative inaction
may equally reflect deferring the issue to the branch of government most
capable of dealing with legal problems. Thus, that branch of government
is free to exercise its own judgment. Yet some courts have recently refus-
ed to adopt the discovery rule upon the rationale that the legislature has
not acted on the issue.
LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, at 289, citing Cordial v. Grimm, - Ind. App.
__ 346 N.E.2d 266 (1976). That rationale could be implied, but was not stated in the
Cordial decision.
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As emphasized in the earlier background discussion of Cordial,
there appear to be no persuasive arguments against a discovery rule
for legal malpractice actions. The policy arguments against any ar-
bitrarily protective form of limitation are overwhelming. If the legal
profession is unusually susceptible to suit, the boundaries of civil
liability should be determined by the legal standard of care re-
quired," not by artificial immunity for both conscientious and
negligent attorneys. Furthermore, the discovery rule, in every
jurisdiction where it is used, does not allow the plaintiff to "sit on
his rights" and thereby contribute to the staleness of his claim. Suit
must be commenced within the statutory period after the client
discovers or should have discovered his cause of action, whichever
comes first. As the Florida experience has demonstrated, a
discovery rule for legal malpractice may ultimately decrease rather
than increase litigation. 9
Indiana courts may eventually arrive at a test for legal
malpractice which is less favorable to plaintiffs than a pure
discovery rule. Equitable use of the continuous representation doc-
trine and damage rule to determine when a claim "accrues" under
the general negligence statute of limitations would achieve substan-
tial justice." The Cordial decision, however, should not be followed.
[W]hen an attorney raises the statute of limitations to oc-
clude a client's [legal malpractice] action before that client
has had a reasonable opportunity to bring suit, the
78. For a thorough discussion of the standard of care required for attorneys
and current case law, see Comment, New Developments in Legal Malpractice, 26 AM.
U.L. REV. 408, 408-21 (1977). See also LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, at §§ 111-249;
Note, Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice, 43 IND. L.J. 771 (1967).
79. See note 21 supra.
80. See notes 23 and 25 supra and accompanying text. That is, liberal judicial
application of the above rules would save most legal malpractice claims from the tem-
poral bar. A proper definition of when the attorney-client relationship ends, notes
72-74 supra, would prevent premature commencement of the statute of limitations,
allowing the attorney an opportunity to correct his error, if possible, and allowing the
client to trust and rely on his attorney until litigation has been concluded. In those
cases where the attorney's negligence does not cause immediate damage, such as
negligently drafted wills, contracts, title documents or bad legal advice, the statute
should not commence to run until actual injury has occured. See generally note 25
supra and authorities cited therein.
Other writers have proposed legislation which would combine the discovery
rule with an outside limitation. Note, Legal Malpractice-Is the Discovery Rule the
Final Solution?, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 795, 808-11 (1973); Note, Commencement of the
Statute, supra note 4, at 243. Any such outside limitation, however, would arbitrarily
bar those claims for negligence which do not result in immediate damages.
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resulting ban of the action not only starkly works an in-
justice upon the client but partially impugns the very in-
tegrity of the legal profession.81
81. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart and Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 192, 98
Cal. Rptr. 837, 847, 491 P.2d 421, 431 (1971).
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